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Abstract
Background: The fate of tropical forests is a global concern, yet many far-reaching decisions affecting forest resources are
made locally. We explore allocation of logging rights using a case study from Loreto, Peruvian Amazonia, where millions of
hectares of tropical rainforest were offered for concession in a competitive tendering process that addressed issues related
to locality.
Methodology/Principal Findings: After briefly presenting the study area and the tendering process, we identify and define
local and non-local actors taking part in the concession process. We then analyse their tenders, results of the tendering, and
attributes of the concession areas. Our results show that there was more offer than demand for concession land in the
tendering. The number of tenders the concession areas received was related to their size and geographic location in relation
to the major cities, but not to their estimated timber volumes or median distances from transport routes. Small and Loreto-
based actors offered lower yearly area-based fees compared to larger ones, but the offers did not significantly affect the
results of the tenders. Local experience in the form of logging history or residence near the solicited concession areas, as
well as being registered in the region of Loreto, improved the success of the tenders.
Conclusions/Significance: The allocation process left a considerable number of forest areas under the management of
small and local actors, and if Peru is to reach its goal of zero deforestation rate by safeguarding 75 per cent of its forests by
2020, the small and the local actors need to be integrated to the forest regime as important constituents of its legitimacy.
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Introduction
The fate of tropical forests is a global environmental issue [1],
yet many far-reaching decisions concerning forest resources are
made at local level [2]. Peru possesses the fourth largest tropical
rainforests on Earth. The country has recently set the ambitious
goals of safeguarding 75 per cent of its forests, and reducing
deforestation rate to zero by 2020, through the ‘‘National Pro-
gramme of Forest Conservation for Climate Change Mitigation’’
[3]. However, the combination of extensive forests, sparsely
distributed valuable timber, difficult physical access, high level of
poverty, widespread unemployment, and insufficient funding for
control and monitoring have made it difficult for Peruvian
authorities to efficiently enforce formal rules regulating access,
logging activities, and forest management [4–6].
In Peru, all natural resources, including forests, are owned by
the state as a part of the national wealth. Up until the early 2000s,
the Peruvian access regime to forest resources was in effect based
on, and ideally suited for, migratory selective harvest; logging
permits were short in duration and small in extent [7]. A new
forest law passed in 2000 [8] and implemented during the 2000s
pursued to change this habit by e.g. introducing long term forest
concessions as the main access mechanism to forests [5,9]. Since
then, however, the Peruvian forest regime has been in a constant
turmoil; new reforms have been implemented and new forest
values, such as ecosystem services, introduced [10]. Renegotiation
of power-relations between the state, private, and communal
actors has also led to major protests against regime changes
perceived unjust by local communities [4–5,9,11]. We argue that
lack of locally perceived legitimacy is one of the most important
underlying reasons for the troublesome implementation of the
recent forest sector reforms in Peru.
In any case, more than 7 million hectares of forest concessions
have to date been allocated in separate competitive tenderings in
different Amazonian regions of Peru [5,9], and they are likely to
remain a central part of any future access regime. Forest concessions
are formal contracts between forest owner (in the Peruvian case this
is the state) and another party (concession holder, concessionaire), by
which the concession holder leases a right to exploit forest resources,
accompanied by the obligation to manage them according to legally
established principles and methods within a specified area and a
specified time-frame [12]. The success or failure of the Peruvian
concessions potentially has substantial long-term effects on forest
disturbance rates and biological diversity in the region [13],
considering that the concession period is 40 years, which, in the
moment of expiration, can be renewed by the parties [8].
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In this study, we examine the allocation process of logging rights
through forest concessions in Loreto, Peruvian Amazonia, where
more than 4 million hectares of tropical lowland rainforest were
offered for tender in a competitive allocation process (tendering) in
the year 2004. We first briefly describe the study area and the
concession allocation process in Loreto in 2004. In continuation, we
analyse a number of data sets describing the concession areas
(hereafter concession units), as well as actors that took part in the
tendering, their tenders, and the results of the process. In order to
explore the role of locality in the allocation process, we test which
attributes of the concession units were related to the number of
tenders they received, and then assess the differences between local
and non-local actors regarding their economic offers and their success
in the tendering. Finally, we discuss the implications of locality on the
current and future forest governance and its legitimacy in Amazonia.
Materials and Methods
Study area and allocation process
Loreto is the largest of the 25 Peruvian regions with an
extension of 368,900 km2, equalling the size of Germany, and
comprising more than 28 percent of the Peruvian territory
(Figure 1). The tropical lowland rainforests covering the area are
among the most diverse ecosystems on Earth [14], and harbour a
particularly high diversity of trees [15]. Despite its size, Loreto’s
human population is less than 1 million (,4 percent of all
Peruvians), of which c. 500,000 live in and around the region’s
capital city Iquitos. Loreto is geographically and culturally
relatively isolated and has a strong regional identity [16]. It also
has a tradition of export-led forestry [17]. Although long distances
and the almost complete lack of terrestrial roads form a constant
challenge, forestry is one of the most important economic activities
in the region. According to Tello Ferna´ndez et al. [17], forestry
contributes to around 50 per cent of rural jobs, and forms more
than 70 per cent of the value of all exports in Loreto.
In Loreto the forest areas eligible for concession were delimited
in 2001 [9]. The tendering was opened in June 2002, and
suspended the next month [18] mainly due to strong criticism
from local timber companies [5]. The companies’ concern was
based on at least two obvious reasons: first, new competitors would
potentially either enter, or emerge within, the region; and second,
the cost of forest management and timber extraction would
Figure 1. Forest concession units in Loreto, and the number of tenders (concession dapplicants) they received in the allocation
process 2004. The cities of Iquitos and Pucallpa are marked with red squares. The concession Blocks are marked with dashed-line ovals indicated
with letters A, B, and C.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.g001
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potentially increase, due to new legal requirements. There was no
legal restriction for foreign participation in the concession process,
however the tenderings’ scoring system, favouring residence or
former logging contracts near the solicited concession areas, in
addition to tight schedules, hindered international participation.
This subtle exclusion of foreigners and the consequent inclusion of
the largely informal local small-scale extractors into the formal
access-regime was apparently one way to legitimise the reform.
The tendering was reopened in November 2003. Overall, 749
concession units with a total area of 4,644,163 hectares, were
offered, the average size of a concession unit being 6,200 hectares
(min = 5,000 ha, max = 9,944 ha). The base documents of the
tendering were available at a cost of 30 Peruvian nuevos soles (c.
8.50 USD), and a total of 726 base documents were sold. Each
applicant submitted a technical tender and an economic offer. The
technical tender included information on the applicant’s expe-
rience and locality, available assets, and work plan, with a
maximum score of 100 points. An important feature of the scoring
system was that it explicitly favoured local actors; the closer to the
solicited concession unit the applicant resided or had past logging
contracts, the higher the score obtained.
The economic offer, in turn, was the yearly area-based fee the
applicant promised to pay for the total of the concession area. The
score of the economic offer was calculated by dividing each offer
by the highest bid in the same unit and multiplying the quotient by
100; the maximum score thus being 100. The base value (starting
price) of the area-based concession fee was 0.40 USD/ha/year
[19], which was uniform in all of the concession units nationwide
regardless of their location or production potential.
In order to weight the technical tender in comparison to the
economic offer, the technical tender was valued as having a weight
of 90 per cent of the total score of the applicant, while the
economic offer was worth 10 per cent. This decision was made in
order to avoid the tendering turning into an auction, which would
arguably discriminate against local actors with limited capital
assets. An auction could also potentially form an incentive for
unrealistically high offers that had been seen in former allocation
processes in Madre de Dios and Ucayali regions, where the first
tenderings gave more weight to the economic offer [20].
The total number of actors taking part in the tendering was 328,
and 64 per cent (n = 211) of them won a concession. The most
numerous group of the participants were individuals (70 per cent,
n = 230), whereas companies constituted a quarter of the
applicants (25 per cent, n = 82), the remainder being partnerships
(associations of two or more individuals committed to form a
formal association or company in case of winning a concession;
5 per cent, n = 15) and one Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO). The tendering was concluded in May 2004, and the vast
majority, 98 per cent (n = 206), proceeded to sign a concession
contract within the next year.
Data and variables used in the analysis of the tendering
We first classified the actors’ locality in order to test differences
between locals’ and outsiders’ behaviour and success in the
tendering. The distinction between locals and outsiders is common
in literature, but as a concept it is often troublesome and vaguely
elaborated [21]. We used a combination of two different crite-
ria derived from separate sources. First, we made a distinction
between actors that were registered in Loreto and the ones that
were registered outside the region; and second, we classified the
same actors in two groups according to their direct experience
related to the surroundings of the concession units that they
solicited. For the analysis, we cross-classified the applicants taking
part in the tendering into four locality classes as presented in
Table 1.
For the first classification, we used the internet database of the
Peruvian taxation authorities, SUNAT (Superintendencia Nacio-
nal de Administracio´n Tributaria) [22]. We retrieved the data
using the name of the applicant (individual, company, or part-
nership) as a key word, and as a result we created a data set with
the registered office or domicile of all formalised economic actors
taking part in the tendering. All applicants with an office or
domicile registered by SUNAT in the region of Loreto were
labelled ‘Loretans’ and the ones registered in any other region or
outside Peru were labelled ‘outsiders’.
The second classification was based on the tendering data
provided by INRENA (Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales),
an institution under the Ministry of Agriculture and at the time
of the tendering directly responsible for the management of
renewable natural resources. In our classification all participants
either residing or with past logging contracts within the watershed
where they solicited a concession unit were labelled ‘locals’,
whereas all the rest were labelled ‘non-locals’. We refer to
‘‘watersheds’’ as a category used by the forest authorities in order
to classify the applicants. We chose the watershed level, as used by
INRENA in the tendering scoring system, to be the appropriate
spatial resolution for this classification because Loreto lacks a
large-scale terrestrial road network and practically all timber
logged is transported fluvially. Thus the mouths of the rivers are
currently the most feasible, if not the only, locations for sys-
tematically controlling the transportation of logged timber.
In the analysis, we first wanted to explore the general popularity
of the different concession units by measuring the concession
popularity as the number of tenders the units received. In order to
study the effects of the geographical location of the units, we
attached six attributes to the concession units: concession Block,
surface area (in hectares), skidding distance (km), distance to closest
city (km), closest city (Iquitos or Pucallpa), and estimated timber
volume (m3) (Table 2). The division of concession Blocks is shown
in Figure 1. Skidding distance describes the median Euclidean
distance to the nearest river, which we use as a proxy for the cost
of transporting felled logs to the primary transport routes formed
by rivers. The skidding distance was defined based on a river data
set manually digitised from 30-meter resolution Landsat TM
imagery by a Finnish-Peruvian environmental cooperation project,
Biodamaz [23]. Although river access depends ultimately on water
levels in tributary waterways, of which many are too small to be
included in our data, our analysis is more realistic and detailed
than the analyses using the distance as the crow flies as a proxy for
accessibility. The same river network data was used to measure the
distances from the concession units to the main timber trade
centres, the cities of Iquitos and Pucallpa. The distance from both
cities along the river network were calculated using the cost-
distance function of ArcGIS 9.2, and the resulting distance to the
closest of these cities was stored as the variable ‘distance to closest
city’. In addition, the variable ‘closest city’ had a value of either
Table 1. Classification of the locality of the applicants based
on INRENA tendering data and SUNAT database [22].
SUNAT ‘Loretans’ SUNAT ‘outsiders’
INRENA ‘locals’ local Loretans local outsiders
INRENA ‘non-locals’ non-local Loretans non-local outsiders
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t001
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Iquitos or Pucallpa, depending on which of these two cities was
closer, via river, to the concession unit in question.
The base documents of the tendering provided a description of
forest types found within the concession units, and the area these
types covered in each of the units. This information was based on
inventories carried out by INRENA [24] and contained
volumetric estimations of timber resources technically available
in different forest types. The data provided theoretical upper and
lower limits for timber volumes, and we used the lower figures to
calculate an estimate of minimum timber volume per hectare
technically available for each concession unit. We acknowledge
limitations in the quality of this data set due to the preliminary
nature of its analysis and inaccurate input data used. However, we
included the variable ‘estimated timber volume’ in our models
because the data was publicly available for all the applicants, and
thus potentially influenced their decisions.
We were also interested in the variables related to the ap-
plicants’ economic offers, and to their probabilities of winning a
concession. Thus, we selected the yearly area-based fee offered
and the result of the tender as response variables in our analyses.
We decided to study the economic offer, expressed as an area-
based fee per year, because it reflects the actor’s willingness to pay
for the concession rights in the long term. The actor’s success,
expressed as the probability of winning a concession, was studied
because it can be used to assess the tendering system’s potential
bias towards local actors. ‘Area-based fee’ was also used as an
explanatory variable when the probability of winning was
modelled. The variables stored as attributes of the applicants
and the concession units are presented in Table 2.
Due to the type and the scale of the actors taking part in the
tendering being potentially related to the economic offers they
make, we classified the applicants according to scale and type. The
participants could either solicit only one concession unit, or more
than one. In the former case the applicant belonged to the scale
class ‘small extractors’ and in the latter to the class ‘medium-sized
actors’. In the tendering scoring system, small extractors were
favoured by higher scores. Furthermore, the variable ‘type of
actor’ was classified into three categories: ‘individual’, ‘company’,
and ‘partnership’. The economic offer of the applicant in USD/
ha/year was stored as variable ‘area-based fee’. Moreover, in
addition to the attributes of the applicants, we wanted to capture
the possible effects of the geographic location, size, and
accessibility of the concession units on the economic offers the
participants made, and therefore we used the variables based on
the concession units’ attributes described above.
Statistical analyses
In order to study the behaviour of the different actors taking
part in the tendering, we examined whether the explanatory
variables (Table 2) were associated with the number of tenders per
concession unit, the area-based fees offered by the applicants, and
the applicants’ probability in winning the solicited concession unit.
The associations between the explanatory variables and the
number of tenders the concession units received, and the area-
based fee offered by the applicants, were examined with regression
models assuming Poisson distributed errors and log link function,
since these responses were count variables. The influence of
the explanatory variables on whether the applicant won the
concession unit or not was examined using logistic regression
model, with binomial errors and logit link function. When needed,
Pearson’s x2 was used to rescale the parameter covariance matrix
to adjust for any under- or overdispersion.
Prior to the analyses, the variables of ‘concession unit area’,
‘median skidding distance’, and ‘estimated timber volume’ were
divided in two categories, based on the variables’ median values
(to distinguish between large and small, close and remote, and
abundant and scarce units). Meanwhile, the variable ‘distance to
the closest city’ was divided in three classes, to detect the possible
effect of remoteness (implying less extraction pressure and thus
more available timber on the one hand, and more difficult access
on the other, which we hypothesised could favour intermediate
distances). The breaking points of these classes are presented in the
Table 2. All concession units were included in the analysis of
popularity, but only the units that received tenders were included
in the analyses of economic offers and tendering success. To
account for the facts that some applicants made a tender for
several concessions, and several concession units had multiple
applicants, we applied Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) to
account for the respective correlation structure in the models
for the area-based fees offered by the applicants, and for the
probability of the applicants for winning the solicited concession
unit [25]. Unstructured working correlation matrix, with conces-
sion identity nested within applicant identity, was used to
accomodate these correlations [25]. Statistical inference was based
on Score test [25]. No stepwise model reduction was applied
because such methods dramatically increase the rate of type I
errors [26], and because our aim here was to obtain the most
accurate point estimates and their confidence intervals (CI)
[27]. In the case of statistically significant association between
categorical variables having more than two levels and the
response, statistical interpretation of the group-differences was
Table 2. Attributes of the applicants and the concession units used as explanatory variables in the models.
Attribute (explanatory variable) Classes/units
Applicants locality local Loretans, non-local Loretans, local outsiders, non-local outsiders
scale small extractors, medium-sized actors
type individuals, companies, partnerships
area-based fee USD/ha/year
Concession units concession Block A, B, C (see Figure 1)
concession unit area #6004 ha, .6004* ha (*median)
skidding distance #6.65 km, .6.65* km (*median)
distance to closest city ,500 km, 500–700 km, .700 km
closest city Iquitos, Pucallpa
estimated timber volume/ha ,80 m3, 80 m3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t002
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based on the 95% confidence intervals of the means. For example,
if the 95% confidence intervals of means overlap half the length of
one arm, this corresponds approximately to statistical significance
at p = 0.05 [28]. All analyses were conducted with SAS statistical
software version 9.2 (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, North Carolina,
USA).
Results
Demand and offer of forest land: popularity of
concession units
The allocation process revealed that there was more offer than
demand for concession units in Loreto; up to 37 per cent (n = 277)
of all the units did not receive a tender at all and only 27 per cent
(n = 200) of the units were subject to competition between two or
more applicants. A mere 4 per cent of the units received tenders
from more than 3 applicants, the maximum being 10 tenders per
unit (Figures 1 and 2).
According to our analysis, the geographical location and the
total area of the concession units had a significant effect on their
popularity (Table 3; concession Blocks presented in Figure 1).
Units in Block B were the most popular, having on average 1.23
tenders per unit (95% confidence intervals [CIs] = 0.96, 1.59),
whereas units in Blocks A and C received on average 0.76 tenders
(95% CIs = 0.58, 0.99) and 1.06 (95% CIs = 0.87, 1.29) per unit,
respectively. Larger concession units received more tenders than
smaller ones (Table 3). That is, large concession units had on
average 1.10 tenders (95% CIs = 0.88, 1.37) compared to, an
average of 0.91 tenders (95% CIs = 0.74, 1.11) in small units.
The river distance to the closest city (Iquitos or Pucallpa) was
also significantly related to the popularity of a given concession
unit (Table 3). Concession units at intermediate distances (500–
700 km) from cities received the highest number of tenders (on
average 1.28 tenders per unit, 95% CIs = 1.02, 1.62), while the
units located closer (on average 0.96 tenders per unit, 95%
CIs = 0.79, 1.16) or further from the cities (on average 0.81 tenders
per unit 95% CIs = 0.60, 1.07) were less popular. This is consistent
with our hypothesis of preference for intermediate distances
because of proximity to cities, implying more extraction pressure –
and as a consequence less timber left – on the one hand, and
growing distance implying more difficult access, on the other.
Meanwhile, whether the concession unit was located closer to
Iquitos or Pucallpa, estimated timber volumes and median
skidding distances of the concession units were not statistically
related to the number of tenders they received (Table 3).
Willingness to pay: area-based fees
The highest area-based fee offered was 1.48 USD/ha/year, and
the highest winning offer was 1.30 USD/ha/year. The offered area-
based fees were related to the locality of the applicants (Table 4).
Figure 3 shows that, on average, non-local outsiders offered the
highest yearly fees per hectare of concession, contrasting to the non-
local Loretans who offered the lowest fees. The economic offers
were also related to the scale of actor (Table 4); small extractors
offered, on average, lower area-based fees than medium-sized actors
(0.52 USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.48, 0.57] vs. 0.64 USD/ha/year
[95% CIs = 0.60, 0.68], respectively). The type of applicant was also
associated with the area-based fees offered (Table 4): partnerships
Figure 2. The distribution of the number of tenders received by the concession units (min 0; max 10).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.g002
Table 3. The effect of explanatory variables on the number of
tenders received by the concession units.
Predictor dfnum,den F P
Distance to the closest city 2, 739 6.15 0.0023
Closest city 1, 739 0.07 0.80
Concession Block 2, 739 10.14 ,0.0001
Concession unit area 1, 739 5.12 0.024
Estimated timber volume/ha 1, 739 0.35 0.55
Median skidding distance 1, 739 0.60 0.44
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t003
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(0.60 USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.55, 0.65] and individuals (0.59
USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.55, 0.63] made almost equally high
offers, whereas companies offered less (0.55 USD/ha/year [95%
CIs = 0.50, 0.59].
Concession units in certain Blocks received higher offers than
units in other Blocks (Table 4). The units in Block C received the
highest offers; an average of 0.65 USD/ha/year (95% CIs = 0.62,
0.72, whereas units in Blocks A and B received on average offers
of 0.52 (95% CIs = 0.47, 0.58) and 0.55 USD/ha/year (95%
CIs = 0.50, 0.61), respectively. Distance to the closest city also had
a significant effect on the area-based fees offered (Table 4);
concession units with short (0.60 USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.56,
0.64] and intermediate (0.60 USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.56,
0.65] distances from the closest city received, on average, higher
offers than those located further (0.53 USD/ha/year [95%
CIs = 0.48, 0.59]). Whether the closest city was Iquitos or Pucallpa
influenced area-based fees as well, since in the case of Iquitos the
area-based fees were, on average, lower (0.53 USD/ha/year
[95% CIs = 0.51, 0.55]) than in the case of Pucallpa (on average
0.63 USD/ha/year [95% CIs = 0.55, 0.71]). Moreover, higher
estimated timber volumes per hectare attracted somewhat higher
offers than lower ones (0.60 [95% CIs = 0.57, 0.64] USD/ha/year
vs. 0.55 [95% CIs = 0.50, 0.61]). Neither the distance to the river
network (median skidding distance) nor the concession unit area
were statistically related to the area-based fees offered.
Winners and losers: success of tenders
Table 5 shows that Local Loretans won more than half (1.56
million ha) of all the concession land that was finally allocated in
the tendering (2.58 million ha). There was a statistically significant
relationship between the locality and the success of the applicants
(Table 6). Local Loretans had the highest probability of winning,
compared to non-local Loretans, local outsiders, and non-local
outsiders (Figure 4). It thus seems that in addition to applicants
having previous ties to the forest areas they solicited, Loretans in
general benefitted from the tendering’s scoring system. Applicants
registered outside Loreto, whether or not they were considered
locals, seemed to have lower probabilities of winning a concession.
Although medium-sized actors won the majority of the con-
cession land (1.84 million ha), a considerable area (0.82 million ha)
was also allocated to those small-scale extractors only soliciting one
concession unit (Table 5). Neither the area-based fees offered by
the applicants, nor the type or scale of actor, were statistically
related to the applicants’ success (Table 6).
Discussion
Our analysis revealed three general tendencies in the forest
concession allocation process of Loreto. First, there was little true
competition in the tendering; second, the area-based fees offered
did not significantly affect the results of the tenders; and third, the
Loreto-based applicants had a higher probability of winning a
concession unit than those based outside Loreto.
In the end, only a quarter of all the offered concession units
were subject to two or more competing tenders. However, without
Table 4. The effect of explanatory variables on the area-
based fees (USD/ha/year) offered by the applicants.
Predictor df x2 P
Locality 3 52.8 ,0.0001
Type of actor 2 7.85 0.02
Scale of actor 1 30.0 ,0.0001
Closest city 1 6.62 0.01
Concession Block 2 17.2 0.0002
Concession unit area 1 1.69 0.19
Median skidding distance 1 0.41 0.52
Estimated timber volume/ha 1 4.78 0.029
Distance to the closest city 2 8.87 0.012
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t004
Figure 3. The differences between the offered area-based fees (USD/ha/year) of the four locality groups studied. Squares represent
estimated marginal means and error bars their 95% confidence limits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.g003
Allocating Logging Rights in Peruvian Amazonia
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 May 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 5 | e19704
the rules of the game clearly favouring the small and the local, the
process could arguably have lost its legitimacy before it was even
initiated. Previous examples show that it would have also been
possible to restrict the participation in the process only to small
actors, as was the case in two tenderings organized in the Madre
de Dios and Ucayali regions in 2003 [20]. In Loreto, however, the
allocation system turned out to emphasise the local experience of
the participants rather than their size. Actors registered in Loreto
and with local experience in the form of previous logging con-
tracts, or residence near the solicited concession units, achieved
the largest share of the units and concession area. This indicates
that the allocation method in general, and the scoring system in
particular, were successfully designed to serve the purpose of
favouring applicants that had already established ties with the
offered forest areas.
While this was one way in which the process succeeded in
achieving at least some degree of legitimacy within the region, the
tendering simultaneously failed to fundamentally change the
power-relations regulating access to timber resources in Peruvian
Amazonia [4–5,29–31]. What was important for the forest
industrialists was to guarantee a steady flow of timber, and local
small-scale extractors depending on locally organized chains of
trade are vital for this kind of supply. What these small-scale
extractors needed was to bolster their direct access to the forest.
Although the allocation process left large areas of forest in the
hands of small actors, it is not certain to which degree things have
changed in the field. According to a recent report published by the
Environmental Investigation Agency [4], with the concessions in
function for several years now, it is still commonplace in Loreto
that urban timber merchants equip small-scale extractors by
advance payments which frequently feed a circle of debt and
impoverishment.
Another anxiety that was frequently voiced before the tendering
was that of forest inventories, operative plans, and management
planning required by the forest law, proving to be prohibi-
tively costly and thus making concessions not attainable for small
extractors [32]. This viewpoint cannot be ruled out as an
explanation for the low level of competition in the tendering.
Furthermore, the possibility of small and local actors being used
only as legal representatives of larger timber merchants or
companies cannot be straightforwardly ruled out, but according
to our analysis, the fear of large national or foreign capital over-
whelming small and local applicants – a common concern be-
fore the tendering [33] – proved to be unfounded. While the
concession rights are transferable, i.e. the contracts can be further
traded, the commitment of local actors can be reinforced through
new options based on a wider variety of forest values. New ap-
proaches embedded in the future forest regime could contribute
positively to the Peruvian efforts to halt forest degradation in and
around logging areas. There are several experiences that can be
studied to identify such approaches.
Policy implications
Most Amazonian countries face problems similar to those of
Peru, and many have undergone forest regime reforms during the
last 15 years. In Ecuador and Colombia, the forest regime is in
need of reform, but the lack of detailed analyses of their particular
characteristics hinders comparisons to other Amazonian countries’
forest sector reforms. Neither of these two countries currently
applies long-term forest concessions as a major administrative
arrangement. In Colombia, a new forest law decreed in 2006
introduced a system based on forest concessions, but the law
was declared inconstitutional and revoked in 2008 because its
preparation did not adequately address issues related to consul-
tation of local and indigenous communities [34]. In Ecuador,
the forest policy development has recently been described
as unpredictable [35]. In Bolivia and Brazil, large scale forest
concessions have been implemented, and their reforms have
received more attention internationally [35–36], but comparative
studies between Amazonian countries are still largely lacking.
Recently, major efforts to reshape the forest sector in Peru
have been a consequence of international agreements binding the
Peruvian government to reform forest legislation while also
implementing and enforcing the current rules more efficiently
[4,10,37–38]. Particularly the free trade agreement between Peru
Table 5. The number of concession units and concession area (hectares) applied and won by applicants representing different
locality and scale classes.
Units applied Units won Win% Hectares applied Hectares won Win%
Locality
Local Loretans 380 250 66 2.376,520 1.564,015 66
Non-local Loretans 156 89 57 973,099 536,962 55
Local outsiders 100 42 42 668,699 276,101 41
Non-local outsiders 131 32 24 827,845 206,731 25
Total 767 413 54 4.846,163 2.583,809 53
Scale
Small 227 126 56 1.483,923 821,621 55
Medium-scale 591 299 51 3.680,719 1.840,677 50
Total 818 425 52 5.164,642 2.662,298 52
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t005
Table 6. The effect of explanatory variables on whether or
not the applicant’s tender won the race for a concession.
Predictor df x2 P
Locality 3 19.55 0.0002
Type of actor 2 0.11 0.95
Scale of actor 1 2.45 0.12
Area-based fee 1 0.37 0.55
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019704.t006
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and the US has driven changes in the Peruvian legislation [4]. A
package of laws related to the free trade agreement, including a
new forest law, was approved in 2008. The new law (‘Legislative
decree 1090’) included mechanisms aimed at opening Amazonia
for new investment, such as forest concessions solicited through
private initiative, and it also enabled drastic changes in land-use
designations. In Amazonia, and particularly among the region’s
indigenous population, these changes were commonly seen as
intended to facilitate the privatisation of indigenous peoples’
traditional lands. Consequently, protests culminating in tragic acts
of violence in northern Peru between state agents and indigenous
protesters in June 2009 forced the government to revoke the most
controversial of these laws, including the forest law [10].
Currently, a draft of a new forest law is being discussed in a
process claimed by the government to be more participatory than
the previous one [4,39], yet controversies still remain as to the
implementation of the reform, not least regarding the indigenous
and local communities’ land rights issues and the concessionaires’
ability and willingness to follow the law [40]. As a part of any
future regime, Peru is in need of new approaches integrating wider
environmental values also to the forest concession mechanism.
Today, fortunately, there is more diversity than ever of possible
additional values that can be directly linked to sustainable forest
management. Peruvian forest concessions are intended to be a
long-term commitment to forest management; in addition to the
timber and non-timber resources that the forests under concession
contain, they also entail vital, albeit hard-to-value, ecosystem
services [10,41].
Forest concessions will most likely form an important part of the
National Programme of Forest Conservation for Climate Change
Mitigation [3], promoted by the Peruvian government. The kind
of arrangements that will be applied as a part of the Peruvian
programme in areas surrounding the forest concessions will
certainly affect their feasibility, and vice versa. The Peruvian
programme aims at safeguarding the forest cover in an area of 54
million hectares, representing 75 per cent of Peruvian forests. The
programme is also planned to include direct area-based payments
to its main beneficiaries for conserving forests in their possession.
The beneficiaries are defined as ‘‘[…] the entitled native and rural
communities and population that lives in and around the tropical
Amazonian and dry forests of the country’’ [3]. It remains to be
seen how this will be achieved, and what the role of local small
scale forest concessionaires will be in this deal.
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